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Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two
Approaches to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online
Stacey Dogan*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, courts have developed two distinct approaches in
evaluating trademark claims against online intermediaries. The first and most
common method frames the issue as one of secondary liability: should the
intermediary face liability for wrongdoing committed by its advertisers,
subscribers, or other users of its services? In this approach, courts struggle with the
tension between preserving legitimate, non-infringing uses of technologies on the
one hand, and minimizing infringement on the other. While no clear doctrinal
consensus has formed, courts are converging on a framework centered on specific
knowledge, reasonable response and inducement—principles derived from
trademark law but mirroring their counterparts in copyright.1
At the same time, some opinions have suggested a different form of trademark
liability focused on the intermediary’s choices in designing services that use—or
allow others to use—trademarks in various ways.2 Though branded as direct
trademark infringement, the doctrine bears little resemblance to historical direct
infringement law. Instead, it resembles a roving unfair competition law, leaving
discretion with the fact finder to assess the intermediary’s culpability in enabling
confusion.3 Because the likelihood-of-confusion factors map poorly onto such an
inquiry,4 this form of direct infringement has no clear doctrinal framework. Nor
have courts articulated a coherent normative vision to guide lower courts in shaping
and applying the law. Most troubling, the scant case law has paid little attention to
issues at the core of secondary liability analysis—namely, the need to strike a
balance between infringing and non-infringing uses, and the worry that liability
might threaten legitimate uses of trademarks that enhance competition and increase
consumer choice.
If this mutant form of direct infringement is here to stay, courts must recognize
it as a new cause of action, and must define its normative objectives with an eye to

* Professor and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1249–55 (10th Cir. 2013);
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103–10 (2d Cir. 2010); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,
676 F.3d 144, 163–65 (4th Cir. 2012).
2. See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 152–60; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129–
30 (2d Cir. 2009).
3. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 154–56.
4. See id.
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both benefits and costs of judicial intervention. Rather than balancing arguably
relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors on an ad hoc basis, courts should devise a
new set of considerations addressed specifically to intermediaries. In particular, the
law should distinguish between policies and practices that directly sow confusion,,
and those whose only offense lies in creating an environment where counterfeiting,
passing off or other forms of infringement can occur. While the first type of
behavior may justify direct liability, the second does not. Instead, it resembles the
“mixed-use” conduct that the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against
penalizing, because of potential collateral effects.5 Any rule of liability addressed
to such conduct must take these effects into account; it should target deliberately
harmful behavior, while protecting market actors’ ability to make non-infringing
uses of trademarks and intermediaries’ right to help them.6
Part I outlines some core principles that both justify and discipline the rules
imposing liability for wrongs committed by others. Most of these principles have
surfaced in the copyright context, but they have salience for trademark law. Part II
describes the courts’ application of these principles in evaluating contributory
trademark infringement claims against Internet intermediaries. As their opinions
make clear, contributory infringement doctrine is equipped to balance the rights of
trademark holders against the public’s interest in making non-infringing uses of
marks. Courts may not get it right all the time, but the structure of secondary
liability analysis provides a framework to balance the relevant interests. Part III
contrasts this nuanced, normatively grounded framework with the apparently ad
hoc standards governing so-called direct infringement claims against
intermediaries. Because the direct infringement opinions are scarce and underanalyzed, however, there is much room for development.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
Trademark law has a long history of imposing liability against defendants for
infringement by related parties.7 The Supreme Court most recently addressed the
issue in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., a suit seeking to hold
a pharmaceutical company liable for the behavior of pharmacists who had passed
off its generic product as a famous brand-name drug.8 Citing precedent from the
early 1900s, the Court confirmed that parties can face liability for infringement

5. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435–42 (1984); Henry
v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917); cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932–37 (2005) (noting that the staple article of commerce doctrine
announced in Sony “provides breathing room for innovation and vigorous commerce”).
6. Cf. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 943 (2001) [hereinafter Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?] (“At
its core, Sony is about preventing copyright holders from interfering with consumers’ ability to make
non-infringing uses of technology.”).
7. For a fuller discussion of this history, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1675–82 (2007).
8. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 849–50 (1982).
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committed by others:
[L]iability can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of
another. Even if a manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of
distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing activities under certain
circumstances. Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.9

While Inwood offered a relatively straightforward rule for contributory liability,
it was frustratingly short on normative content. The court of appeals in that case
had misapplied the relevant standard of review, so the Court reversed without
analyzing the substantive claims or defenses.10 As a result, we are left with the
Court’s unadorned statement of black-letter law, with little sense of the goals or
limits of contributory infringement doctrine in trademark law.
Despite its absence in Inwood, however, normative guidance has emerged from
judicial and legislative developments in other areas of intellectual property law. In
particular, the legal response to infringement-enabling technologies in copyright
law has produced a cluster of normative values to govern secondary infringement
analysis. While one could classify these values in various ways, they generally
seek to avoid interference, deter intentional wrongs and encourage responsibility in
dealings with direct infringers.
A. NON-INTERFERENCE
The non-interference principle dictates that indirect liability rules should seek a
balance between providing effective relief to intellectual property holders and
avoiding interference with legitimate commerce.11 It recognizes that suits against
parties other than direct infringers sometimes provide the only meaningful avenue
for relief, either because the related parties are in the best position to prevent the
harm or because a direct infringement suit would be impracticable or ineffective.12
The notion of related-party liability is neither new nor unique to intellectual
property: “[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the

9. Id. at 853–54.
10. In addition to the standard for contributory liability, Inwood raised important questions about
trademark’s functionality doctrine. See id. at 851, 853, 857.
11. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
12. Id. at 442 (finding that indirect copyright liability “is grounded on the recognition that
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device
or publication to the products or activities that make such duplication possible”); id. (noting that
secondary liability ensures “effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly”);
see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) (“When a
widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to . . . effectively
[target] all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor . . . for
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious liability.”); Shapiro, Berstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding copyright liability appropriate against the party in
the best position to police the behavior of the direct infringer).
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concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable
for the actions of another.”13
At the same time, broad secondary liability rules come with costs. In particular,
if liability turns on acts or product sales that enable both lawful and unlawful
conduct, it may chill or increase the costs of legitimate behavior. In Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., for example, a group of copyright holders
sued a VCR manufacturer, claiming that the technology enabled home users to
make infringing copies of television programs.14 Drawing from patent law, the
Court noted that product-based contributory infringement claims could limit the
public’s ability to put the product to lawful, socially productive use:
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an
article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public
interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A finding of
contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market
altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional
equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly granted to the
patentee.15

To avoid undue burden on non-infringing markets, the Sony Court adopted the
“staple article of commerce” doctrine from patent law, holding that the sale of
products used for infringement cannot constitute contributory copyright
infringement as long as the product has a “substantial non-infringing use.”16
Although Sony disavowed any direct connection to trademark law,17 the opinion
holds lessons for related-party liability in trademark. First, it reflects the need for
balance in crafting secondary liability rules, not only in intellectual property, but in
other areas of law as well. While laws may—and often should—reach actors who
do not directly commit the act defined as a violation, sensitivity to the law’s effects
on legitimate behavior is important. Indeed, Sony suggests a presumption against
liability when the defendant is enabling significant lawful behavior that would be
threatened by a ruling against it.18 Second, the Court’s disavowal of trademark’s
rules is itself relevant to the appropriate balance in trademark law. The Court
declined to turn to trademark law for guidance because of trademark law’s

13. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. See generally Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of ThirdParty Trademark Infringement, 2011 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 10, available at http://journals.law.
stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review-stlr/online/mckenna-probabilisticknowledge.pdf; Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in
Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 513 (2009).
14. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
15. Id. at 440–41.
16. Id. at 442.
17. Id. at 439 n.19.
18. Cf. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?, supra note 6, at 950–51 (contending that Sony allows liability
if the defendant could effectively prevent the infringement while preserving non-infringing uses of its
service or technology).
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narrower scope relative to patent or copyright.19 Thus, if anything, courts should
be more hesitant to impose trademark liability in mixed-use cases, i.e., in suits
based on behavior that enables both infringing and non-infringing conduct.20
Because Sony involved the one-time sale of goods, however, it left open the
question of how to treat defendants whose acts facilitate infringement or who have
a continuing relationship with infringers. Since the emergence of the Internet, the
lower courts, the Supreme Court and Congress have moved toward a set of rules to
govern those contexts.
B. CULPABILITY
Taken at face value, Sony could plausibly immunize any defendant whose
behavior or technology has non-infringing applications, regardless of whether the
defendant’s core business model centered on promoting infringement. Indeed, in
the early days of the Internet, defendants relied on Sony’s “staple article of
commerce” doctrine to argue against liability for any Internet-based service that
had substantial non-infringing uses.21 In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the
Supreme Court put an end to that notion, at least for defendants whose
contributions to infringement were deliberate, rather than tangential to a legitimate
motive.22 Grokster involved a peer-to-peer file sharing service that had many legal
uses but whose primary use (and apparent purpose) was to facilitate the sharing of
copyrighted songs and music.23 The Supreme Court found Sony inapplicable,
reasoning that “the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability
derived from the common law.”24 The Court crafted a new doctrine of copyright
inducement, applicable against parties who distribute a product “with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”25
Like Sony, Grokster reflects normative principles that can be generalized to

19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (describing Inwood as a “narrow standard for contributory
trademark infringement,” under which the claims in Sony “would merit little discussion”); see also
Clearline Techs. Ltd. v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19) (describing secondary liability in trademark law as narrower than
copyright); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). This
narrower conception of trademark infringement is not an accident, but reflects the fact that trademark
law does not convey any exclusive right to copy or otherwise use trademarks, but instead provides a
more limited right to prevent others from using marks in ways that confuse—or more recently, dilute—
the distinctiveness of famous marks. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing exclusive rights of
copyright owners), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2012) (trademark infringement and dilution standards,
which turn on misinformation or dilution through tarnishment or blurring).
20. See generally Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806 (“The tests for secondary trademark infringement
are even more difficult to satisfy than those required to find secondary copyright infringement.”).
21. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001); In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647–53 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160–62 (9th Cir. 2005).
22. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 914.
23. Id. at 913.
24. Id. at 934–35.
25. Id. at 936–37.
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apply to other areas of third-party liability, including trademark law. For one thing,
it validates the notion of culpability, i.e., that parties who intentionally help
someone to commit a wrong are legally responsible for the violation, even if their
actions also enable lawful conduct.26 But of equal importance, Grokster defines
culpability narrowly to include only defendants with specific intent to achieve the
infringing outcome.27 Parties that proceed with knowledge—even certainty—that
some people may put their product to illicit use are shielded by the Sony safe
harbor. The Court invoked Sony’s non-interference principle explicitly:
We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or
discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.
Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge
of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of
infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a
distributor to liability. . . . The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.28

Grokster’s fault-based doctrine thus reaffirms the core lesson of Sony: that
merely providing tools for infringement cannot justify liability, as long as those
tools also have lawful application. That rule, moreover, is no mere technicality, but
reflects a normative commitment to protecting “legitimate commerce” against
interference by intellectual property owners. The Court made clear that the noninterference principle continues to protect parties who happen to enable
infringement through otherwise innocuous behavior—even when those parties
know that some infringement will result. Grokster’s inducement doctrine applies
only if the intent is to promote infringement.
Admittedly, the inducement rule announced in Grokster leaves broad discretion
with the fact finder to distinguish between lawful and illicit motives. In Grokster
itself, for example, the Supreme Court found evidence of inducement based largely
on indirect evidence of the defendants’ unlawful intent,29 and subsequent lower
court opinions have adopted a similar “we know it when we see it” approach.30 As
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (outlining rules for contributory
tortfeasors); see also Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV.
184, 232–38 (2006) (noting that tort law defines “intent,” in context of intentional torts, to include
acting: (1) “with the express purpose of causing harm”; or (2) with “substantial certainty” that harm will
result to a particular individual as a result of the behavior); cf. United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363,
1371 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Aiding and abetting a misapplication of bank funds occurs when a bank
employee misapplies bank funds and the defendant knows of the bank’s substantive offense and acts
with intent to further it.”) (emphasis added).
27. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (noting that inducement requires “an affirmative intent that the
product be used to infringe”).
28. Id. at 937 (emphasis added).
29. Id.at 937−40 (describing the evidence supporting a finding of inducement, which included
defendants’ decision to target former Napster users, their failure to adopt filtering technologies and the
enhanced advertising revenues due to the availability of infringing files).
30. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1035−36 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding inducement based on evidence similar to the evidence in Grokster, including enhanced
advertising revenue as a result of infringement). See generally Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We
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Alfred Yen has pointed out, however, by creating an outlet for courts to punish
intentional wrongdoers, Grokster arguably provides breathing space for other
parties whose products and services have both infringing and non-infringing
applications.31
C. REASONABLENESS IN OPERATION
With Sony insulating one-time sellers of mixed-use products and Grokster
condemning those who act with a purpose of infringement, the final principle of
secondary liability grapples with the obligations of parties who act with neutral
motives, but whose ongoing relationships with users give them the power to reduce
or eliminate infringement as it occurs. The guidance here has come from Congress
and the lower courts,32 which have converged on a framework that essentially
requires reasonableness in responding to specific notices of infringement.33
Mindful of Sony, the law stops short of dictating technology design choices or
defining liability by relation to risk creation. As a result, intermediaries need not
anticipate and head off infringement ex ante. Yet the commitment to noninterference does not rule out liability altogether where a defendant lacks intent to
infringe. Liability can result if a defendant either blinds itself to infringement or
fails to take reasonable efforts to respond to notice of infringement.34
The “reasonableness” principle seems—albeit implicitly—to pursue a modified
best-cost-avoider strategy:35 it places responsibility for infringement detection and
elimination with the party best positioned to accomplish each task. Detection falls
on the intellectual property owner, who is best suited to recognize unauthorized
versions of its work or trademark.36
Responsibility for terminating the
See It”: Intermediary Trademark Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7 (2011)
[hereinafter Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”].
31. Yen, supra note 26, at 192 (“[I]nducement gives courts a new tool for holding culpable
defendants liable while reducing the risk of undesirable side effects.”).
32. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
33. “Reasonableness,” of course, is a charged and contested term in the law. Compare, e.g.,
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312
(1996) (distinguishing between rationality (the instrumental pursuit of self-interest) and reasonableness
(“restrain[ing] our pursuit of self-interest by acting in accordance with principles that fix fair terms of
cooperation”)), with Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (defending
the reasonableness standard in tort law as designed to incentivize efficient resource allocation). At this
point, I do not believe that the courts in intermediary cases are consciously pursuing any particular
philosophical conception of “reasonableness.” They are, however, grappling toward a contextual
approach that requires intermediaries to respond to notice when it seems cost-effective and fair for them
to do so.
34. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
35. I call this a “modified” best-cost-avoider strategy because a pure best-cost-avoider approach
would take system design into account and require intermediaries to take reasonable steps to head off
infringement before it occurs; this modified form takes the technology as a given and deals only with
questions of detection and response.
36. Courts have sometimes said this explicitly, but more often they have avoided the normative
question and simply invoked Sony (or Inwood) for the notion that designers of technologies or services
have no affirmative obligation to design their products to avoid infringement. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ)
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infringement, in turn, rests on the intermediary, assuming that it has specific
knowledge and control over the means used to infringe.37 If the structure of a
defendant’s system and its relationship to infringers gives it the power to stop
known infringement without threatening lawful use, then the law requires it to
exercise that power.38
Doctrinally, this approach has emerged through common-law development of
contributory infringement standards in copyright and trademark law,39
complemented in copyright by the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).40 Both copyright and trademark law allow
liability for parties that knowingly facilitate another party’s infringement.41 Sony
and Grokster teach that design choices alone cannot result in liability under this
standard, unless the technology either has no substantial non-infringing use or is
coupled with a deliberate intent to cause infringement.42 As a result, much of the
action in secondary liability cases occurs after the technology has launched, and
consumers use it to infringe.43 Copyright and trademark holders charge
intermediaries with contributory infringement because they purportedly “know” of
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Certainly, the evidence adduced at trial
failed to prove that eBay was a cheaper cost avoider than Tiffany with respect to policing its marks. But
even more importantly, even if it were true that eBay is best situated to staunch the tide of trademark
infringement to which Tiffany and countless other rights owners are subjected, that is not the law.”);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (“Copyright holders know
precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than
service providers like Veoh, who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is
not.”).
37. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2007).
38. Id. (noting question of fact as to “whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google
to refrain from providing access to infringing images”). Again, this principle is often implicit. Courts
channel their analyses through doctrinal standards of “knowledge” and “substantial assistance,” but the
ultimate question is whether, given the intermediary’s knowledge of infringing acts and the tools at its
disposal, it seems reasonable to require it to act on that knowledge. See generally Dogan, Is Napster a
VCR?, supra note 6.
39. Vicarious liability has played a more limited role, primarily in copyright. Courts analyzing
vicarious liability have shown a similar emphasis on context, with a core inquiry into whether the
defendant acted reasonably in policing infringement in its system, in light of the system’s architecture.
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). The DMCA provides a “safe harbor” for intermediaries that
implement a system for receiving notification of infringement and blocking access to infringing content
that they learn of through that system. See id.
41. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982) (stating that liability
would turn on whether petitioners intentionally induced mislabeling by pharmacists); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (“[T]he label ‘contributory infringement’ has
been applied in a number of lower court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the
direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred.”).
42. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (“Sony
barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the
design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in
fact used for infringement.”); id. at 939 n.12 (“Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a
court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take
affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.”).
43. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172–73.
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infringement or counterfeiting behavior and fail to stop it.44 Courts thus have to
decide two issues: first, what level of “knowledge” satisfies the contributory
infringement standard, and second, to what lengths must intermediaries go to
eliminate the behavior?
In addressing these questions, courts have taken a contextual, pragmatic
approach that reflects reasonableness and modified best-cost-avoider principles.
The approach dates back to the seminal opinion in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., which considered whether online
service provider Netcom contributorially infringed by failing to remove
copyrighted content after the copyright holder informed it of the posting.45 In
everything from assessing the sufficiency of the notice to considering the service
provider’s obligation to respond, the court asked whether the service provider acted
reasonably.46 In analyzing notice, for example, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that only a formal copyright registration would suffice, but the court
showed more sympathy for the idea that a plausible claim of fair use could defeat a
showing of knowledge:
Where a BBS [computer bulletin board service] operator cannot reasonably verify a
claim of infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of
copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder’s failure to provide the
necessary documentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the operator’s
lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability for
contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its
system.47

Similarly, in deciding whether Netcom had “substantially participated” in its
user’s infringement, the court considered the feasibility and fairness of requiring
the intermediary to block the infringing content.48 The court found Netcom to be in
a different position than a mere landlord, based on its ongoing role in enabling
infringement and its ability to terminate it: “[I]t is fair, assuming Netcom is able to
take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiff’s copyrighted works, to
hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of
Erlich’s infringing messages yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of Erlich’s
purpose of publicly distributing the postings.”49 Netcom’s capabilities, in other
words, required it to act, but only if it knew of the infringement and could stop it
with “simple measures” that would not interfere with its other operations.
Intermediary copyright law has developed substantially since Netcom, and a
substantial part of that development has been animated by the notion that
intermediaries must act reasonably when they learn of infringement on their

44.
45.
1995).
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
See id. at 1374.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1375.
Id.
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services.50 Admittedly, the law is not a model of clarity, and critics claim that legal
uncertainty has chilled Internet innovation.51 What constitutes reasonable
intermediary behavior, moreover, lies in the eye of the beholder. Both courts and
Congress, however, have embraced a modified best-cost-avoider approach: to
encourage intermediaries to share responsibility for responding to known
infringement on their networks, without mandating ex ante policing, filtering or
other preventative technology design.52 Intermediaries need not seek out
infringement, but they must act when they obtain knowledge of specific infringing
content.53 The DMCA, in particular, establishes a notice and takedown regime that
limits liability for intermediaries that act promptly upon receiving knowledge of
infringement.54
The million-dollar question, of course, is what level and type of knowledge
triggers an intermediary’s duty to act. Courts appear to be moving toward a
consensus on four points. First, “knowledge” under the DMCA means specific
knowledge of particular infringing content, rather than generalized awareness of
infringement on the intermediary’s network.55 Second, such specific knowledge
need not arise from formal, DMCA-compliant copyright notices; it can result from
third-party communications or other “facts that would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”56 Third, the underdeveloped “willful blindness” doctrine forbids intermediaries from turning a blind
eye and actively avoiding knowledge of infringement.57 And fourth, neither the
50. See also Conference Report on H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. REP. NO.
105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter DMCA Conference Report], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt796/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt796.pdf (noting that the DMCA
safe harbor “preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to
detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment”).
51. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, How the DMCA’s Online Copyright Safe Harbor Failed, TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (June 1, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/06/how-thedmcas-online-copyright-safe-harbor-failed.htm; Eric Goldman, Want to End the Litigation Epidemic?
Create Lawsuit-Free Zones, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ericgoldman/2013/04/10/want-to-end-the-litigation-epidemic-create-lawsuit-free-zones.
52. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021−22 (9th Cir.
2013); DMCA Conference Report, supra note 50, at 72. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing
Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without
Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110 (2008).
53. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). The DMCA limits service provider liability for linking, caching,
transmission and storage of content at a user’s direction, as long as the service provider qualifies as such
and satisfies other requirements of the statute. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26−28.
55. See Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1020−23; Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30−32.
56. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. This so-called “red-flag” knowledge, like actual, subjective
knowledge, triggers the intermediary’s obligation to remove or disable infringing content. Id.; see also
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
57. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34−35. “Willful blindness” does not appear in the DMCA; the
Second Circuit imported it from the common law. See id. at 35 (“Because the [DMCA] does not speak
directly to the willful blindness doctrine, [17 U.S.C. § 512(m)] limits—but does not abrogate—the
doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the willful blindness doctrine may be applied . . . to demonstrate
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.”). Because the DMCA
explicitly rules out any obligation to monitor or search for infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 512(m), willful
blindness cannot result from a failure to act; it can occur only when an intermediary makes a “deliberate
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willful blindness doctrine nor the “red flag” knowledge principle requires the
intermediary to take affirmative steps to monitor or seek out infringement.58
This contextualized, fact-specific approach to knowledge no doubt reduces the
power of the DMCA safe harbor. In particular, as Eric Goldman has pointed out,
the “red flag” knowledge and willful blindness doctrines can prolong litigation and
draw out discovery, which can drain the resources of upstart intermediaries.59
Substantively, however, these doctrines have understandable appeal for a Congress
and courts seeking a balanced approach to intermediary responsibility. Even if
copyright holders ordinarily have the burden of detecting and giving notice of
infringement, when an intermediary has specific knowledge of a blatant act of
infringement, it seems reasonable and cost-effective to require it to act without
waiting for a formal notice. And if courts limit “red-flag” knowledge to such
unequivocal infringement, they will preserve the Netcom notion of plausible
deniability.60 Intermediaries who learn of allegedly infringing behavior but make a
reasonable determination that the behavior is protected by fair use, for example,
have room to argue that the infringement would not have been “obvious” to a
reasonable person.61
When combined with the non-interference principle, the reasonableness
principle suggests that rules of intermediary liability should encourage reasonable
response to known wrongdoing, without burdening other socially valuable uses of
online technologies.
***
These three core principles—non-interference, fault and reasonableness of
response—have shaped the rules of secondary liability in copyright and trademark
law. Courts have refused to impose ex ante obligations on intermediaries to
prevent infringement because of concerns about collateral effects,62 but they have
not hesitated to single out deliberate wrongdoers or those who fail to act
responsibly in responding to known infringement. As the above discussion
demonstrates, the limitations built into copyright and trademark’s secondary

effort to avoid guilty knowledge.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)).
58. Id.
59. See Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital: A Cautionary Tale of Rightsowner
Overzealousness, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2011, 8:19 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org
/archives/2011/12/umg_v_shelter_c.htm. Specifically, Goldman notes that because internal and third
party communications can establish red flag knowledge, plaintiffs can drain defendants’ resources by
seeking discovery of voluminous communications between the intermediary and its users. See id.
(pointing out that, despite its win in court, the video-streaming service Veoh ran out of money: “This
case’s real result is that Veoh is legal, but Veoh is dead—killed by rightsowner lawfare that bled it
dry.”).
60. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
61. Any notice of infringement emanating from the copyright holder itself, of course, must satisfy
the formal notice requirements in the DMCA, to avoid unraveling the statutory process. See UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1024−25 (9th Cir. 2013). See
generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (DMCA’s formal notice requirements).
62. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
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liability standards are neither accidental nor anachronistic; to the contrary, they
reflect a normative commitment to distinguishing between those who engage in
behavior that is itself harmful and those whose wrong lies in enabling someone
else’s harmful acts. Unless these facilitators act with illicit purpose, the law limits
their obligation to snuffing out particular instances of infringement, in order to
preserve their ability to help legitimate actors. This limitation is intended to ensure
public access to technology and intellectual property for socially valuable, noninfringing uses.
II. CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE
INTERNET
Given the apparently narrow standard of Inwood, there was some fear among
scholars that dealing with online intermediaries under standards of contributory,
rather than direct, infringement would effectively provide them immunity in
trademark suits.63 At the other extreme, some (including this author) feared that
aggressive liability standards in trademark law would hobble Internet commerce.64
Contributory trademark doctrine, however, gives courts adequate tools to balance
the core principles of intermediary liability. On the one hand, it promises
meaningful—”not merely symbolic”65—protection for trademark holders who
identify abuses of their trademarks online.66 On the other hand, by focusing on
known acts of infringement, contributory infringement doctrine seeks to avoid
interference with legitimate trade, including legal and information-disseminating
uses of trademarks. Of course, trademark holders would prefer a standard requiring
more aggressive policing by intermediaries,67 and intermediaries fear the costs of
responding to notice of infringement.68 But the standard emerging in the case law
suggests that courts are groping toward a reasonable balance. While courts may
63. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2007) (suggesting that rejecting direct infringement
claims against those who facilitated infringement would result in “immunity” for search engines and
other online intermediaries).
64. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2007) (warning of “a world in which intermediaries, for
fear of liability, fail to use consumer-generated trademark signals at all in designing their business
models”).
65. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
66. See generally Thomas C. Rubin, Leveraging Notice and Takedown to Address Trademark
Infringement Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 581 (2014) (explaining that IP owners are in the best
position to identify infringement of their rights).
67. So would some scholars. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online
Trademark Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463 (2014) (describing
courts’ current approach to contributory trademark infringement as “wooden” and “binary,” and arguing
in favor of a full “least cost avoider” approach).
68. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS ON INNOVATION,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY: INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ SAFE HARBORS AND
LIABILITY 3 (2012), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ISPLiability_FNL.pdf (noting that “Internet
intermediaries often do not have the legal resources to review takedown notices” and that “the cost of
compliance means that most Internet intermediaries are not able to bear the costs of hosting critical or
unpopular content”).
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not dictate design choices or require affirmative policing, they will take the
“reasonableness” principle seriously in assessing intermediaries’ response to notice
of infringement. And though this reactive approach may appear, at first glance, to
be a “wooden” application of the non-interference principle,69 it may well prove to
be an optimal allocation of enforcement efforts between intellectual property
holders and intermediaries.70
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. is the seminal example.71 Tiffany sued eBay for
its failure to stop the widespread counterfeit sales of Tiffany jewelry on eBay’s
auction site. Tiffany’s theory was contributory infringement, i.e., that eBay either
knew or should have known “that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold
ubiquitously on its website,” but nonetheless “continued to make its services
available to infringing sellers.”72 eBay, in turn, pointed to its elaborate system for
receiving and responding to notices of counterfeit goods sold on its service.73 In
eBay’s view, Inwood limited liability to those who knowingly facilitated particular
instances of infringement.74 Because eBay itself took swift action upon receiving
specific knowledge of counterfeit auctions, such a standard would preclude liability
against it.
Both the district court and the Second Circuit agreed with eBay’s interpretation
of Inwood and its application to the facts of the Tiffany case.75 On its face, the
Second Circuit’s analysis of contributory infringement looks like a rote application
of Inwood, without much normative inquiry. After reciting the legal standard, the
court quoted Sony as endorsing an individual acts-based interpretation of Inwood.76
Having determined, as a matter of doctrine, that Inwood limits liability to parties
who know of specific acts of infringement,77 the court easily concluded that
Tiffany had failed to make its case.78 At least in the contributory infringement
portion of its opinion, the court avoided any discussion of reasonableness or
whether eBay had an obligation to run its operations responsibly.
The full opinion, however, reveals a more nuanced and contextual analysis of
eBay’s reasonableness, not only in responding to infringement, but also in opening
itself to knowledge of it. After rejecting the contributory infringement claim under
the Inwood standard, the court considered Tiffany’s alternative argument, that eBay
should face liability for willfully blinding itself to the pervasive counterfeit sales.79
69. See Dinwoodie, supra note 67.
70. See Rubin, supra note 66.
71. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 106.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 107; see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
76. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 108 (noting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Inwood as applying
to one who either “intentionally induce[s] . . . customers to make infringing uses” of its technologies, or
who “suppl[ies] its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaged in continuing
infringement” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19
(1984)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Or, of course, those who induce the third party infringement. Id. at 106.
78. Id. at 109.
79. Id. at 109–10.
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The court agreed with Tiffany that willful blindness could constitute “knowledge”
for purposes of contributory infringement, but found willful blindness absent in this
case.80 More specifically, the court upheld the district court’s factual finding
regarding willful blindness, which itself was based on a detailed examination of the
efforts that eBay made to root out counterfeit auctions.81 While rejecting the notion
that eBay had an obligation to “ferret out” infringement, the district court opinion
was rife with images of eBay’s reasonableness in making such ferreting-out
possible.82 The district court opinion thus suggested—without holding—that
eBay’s generalized knowledge of widespread counterfeiting required it to do
something to facilitate the detection and removal of counterfeit goods. The
problem with Tiffany’s argument was that eBay had done something; indeed, it had
done a lot:
[T]he evidence establishes that when eBay had general knowledge of counterfeiting
on its website, it took reasonable steps to investigate and stop that wrongdoing
through general anti-fraud measures. Indeed, eBay has invested significant financial,
technological, and personnel resources in developing tools to ferret out and eliminate
counterfeit goods from its website.83

In retrospect, Tiffany was an easy case. eBay not only responded to proven
cases of infringement, but also took preemptive efforts to thwart counterfeit sales
on its site. If efforts like those were required to avoid a finding of willful
blindness, smaller intermediaries could never survive an infringement suit. The
Second Circuit’s opinion, however, stopped short of defining willful blindness in
this way. As in the copyright context, the court made clear that generalized
knowledge of infringement does not make an intermediary willfully blind. Willful
blindness, instead, requires deliberate avoidance of knowledge of infringement.84
eBay’s own actions were almost certainly sufficient, but not necessary, to avoid
liability.
Tiffany promotes the core principles of secondary liability in intellectual
property law. It does not simply immunize intermediaries; to the contrary, its
willful blindness analysis suggests that intermediaries who actively avoid
knowledge of infringement face a real risk of liability. The law thus promotes
reasonableness in intermediary operations.85 But it stops short of imposing
80. Id. at 109.
81. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 515.
84. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109−10 (suggesting that if eBay had “intentionally shielded itself from
discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them, eBay might very well have
been charged with knowledge”); id. (“When [a service provider] has reason to suspect that users of its
service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular infringing
transactions by looking the other way.”).
85. “Reasonableness,” of course, does not require the intermediary to do the impossible, and
courts have made clear that contributory infringement defendants must have “sufficient control over the
infringing activity to merit liability.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d
228, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 471
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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requirements that might interfere with legitimate use of technology or, indeed, of
trademarks. By limiting enforcement responsibilities to known instances of
infringement, the opinion allows resellers and others to make legal, information
disseminating uses of marks.86 In so doing, it leaves open the possibility of faultbased liability against intermediaries who deliberately enable another party’s
infringement.
Other opinions follow a similar contextual analysis of contributory infringement,
refusing to find liability that might interfere with legitimate operations but
imposing it against parties that appear eager to promote or ignore infringement.
For example, the Southern District of New York found contributory liability
against a credit card company that, even after receiving a copy of a legal complaint
of counterfeiting, continued to provide credit card services to the counterfeiter.87
The Fourth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Google, based on
evidence that the search engine had allowed “known infringers and counterfeiters”
to continue to use its keyword-based advertising service.88 The Northern District
of New York allowed a claim alleging that a party “offer[ed] licensing rights to
images containing [plaintiff’s trademarks], despite knowing that the images
constituted [trademark] infringement.”89 In another case, the Southern District of
New York rejected a contributory infringement claim against Amazon.com, when
Amazon had “specifically sought to bar” the defendant “from infringing on the
trademarks of third parties.”90 Moreover, after receiving specific notice, Amazon
had “promptly initiated enforcement action against [the direct infringer] and
eventually terminated its contractual relationship with the company in large part
because it continued to infringe on plaintiff’s mark.”91
Finally, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., while not a traditional Internet
intermediary case, further demonstrates the importance of reasonableness and
context in contributory trademark infringement standards.92 The case involved
allegations that one of Lens.com’s affiliates had placed confusing ads using 1-800
Contacts’ trademarks as keywords.93
1-800 Contacts sued Lens.com for
contributory infringement, claiming that it knew of its affiliate’s infringement and
failed “to make reasonable efforts to halt the affiliate’s practice.”94 Lens.com
86. Cf. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 (in discussing direct infringement claims against eBay, finding no
liability because “eBay used the [Tiffany] mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered
for sale on its website”); id. at 103 (“To impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness
of all of the purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of
genuine Tiffany goods.”).
87. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(FM), 2013 WL 4046380, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (noting evidence that the defendant “had knowledge that [their clients] traded
in counterfeit products, or was willfully blind to that fact”); see also Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
88. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 163–65 (4th Cir. 2012).
89. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
90. Sellify, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10268, 2010 WL 4455830, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 2010).
91. Id.
92. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013).
93. Id. at 1237.
94. Id. at 1252.
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appeared not to have known about the infringement initially, but on receiving the
complaint, it could hardly deny general notice of the confusing ads.95 Lens.com,
however, contended that this general notice failed to satisfy Inwood, because
Lens.com had no knowledge of which of its more than 10,000 affiliates had placed
the offending ads.96 Under a wooden application of Inwood, Lens.com would
appear to have the better argument. The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected this
reading of the precedent, in an opinion that—for the first time—explained the
specific-notice requirement as an attempt to reconcile the principles of noninterference and reasonableness:
The obvious rationale for ordinarily requiring that the defendant know the identity of
the infringer is that otherwise the defendant could not halt the infringement without
also stopping perfectly proper conduct—throwing the baby out with the bath water, so
to speak. But what if, as argued in the case before us, the defendant need not know
the identity of the infringer to stop the allegedly infringing practice without affecting
legitimate conduct? We do not infer from Rosetta Stone and Tiffany that either court
would have required knowledge of the particular offender to impose contributory
liability in such a situation.97

Inwood’s specific-knowledge requirement, in other words, exists to protect the
rights of non-infringers to engage in lawful uses of marks—and the right of
intermediaries to help them. On the other hand, if the intermediary can cut off the
offending conduct without substantially impairing lawful use, then the
reasonableness principle suggests that it should do so. In 1-800 Contacts, the facts
suggested that Lens.com could have prevented the ongoing infringement simply by
sending an email blast to its network of affiliates.98 Absent such an attempt, the
court held that “a reasonable jury could find that during the period between the
filing of [the] complaint and Lens.com’s corrective action, Lens.com knew that at
least one of its affiliates was publishing an ad bearing 1-800 Contact’s mark, yet it
did not take reasonable action to promptly halt the practice.”99
Together, these cases reveal contributory infringement as a flexible doctrine
designed to promote the core principles of secondary liability. Its inducement
branch assures liability for culpable parties. For others—those whose acts create a
risk of wrongdoing but who are not wrong themselves—the doctrine takes a
contextualized approach to determining what they knew and what they could do
with their knowledge. Consistent with the non-interference principle, the doctrine
ordinarily limits liability to those who know of specific acts of infringement and
fail to use the tools at their disposal to stop it. However, the concept of willful
blindness, paired with the “reasonable response” analysis in 1-800-Contacts,
together suggest that even those with only generalized knowledge of infringement
have a duty not to structure their business to avoid knowledge of infringement, and

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id. at 1254–55 (emphasis added).

(2) 37.4 DOGAN (DO NOT DELETE)

518

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

9/22/2014 2:44 PM

[37:4

to act responsibly in stopping known, specific infringing acts. The contributory
infringement standard in Inwood, complemented by a robust doctrine of willful
blindness, thus offers a balanced and normatively grounded approach to
intermediary liability online.
III. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
Unlike the carefully calibrated balance in contributory infringement doctrine,
direct infringement claims against intermediaries lack the normative coherence that
might both justify them and define their limits. Given the paucity of opinions
discussing this type of claim and the flimsiness of theses opinions’ analyses, it may
be premature to fret about the doctrine. The two recent opinions that have endorsed
direct infringement claims,100 however, give reason to worry that direct
infringement could disturb the balance between culpability, reasonable response
and non-interference—a balance that is critical to distinguishing between
wrongdoing and risk creation, and thus ensuring the availability of trademarks and
technologies for information-facilitating, non-infringing use.
The first opinion, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., involved claims against
Google based on its keyword advertising program, which allows advertisers to
place ads keyed to trademarks as search terms.101 The plaintiff had alleged that
Google’s use of Rescuecom’s marks in this program caused a likelihood of
confusion, “in that would-be purchasers (or explorers) of its services who search
for its website on Google are misleadingly directed to the ads and websites of its
competitors in a manner which leads them to believe mistakenly that these ads or
websites are sponsored by, or affiliated with Rescuecom.”102 Because Google
enabled this potential confusion, the court suggested it could face liability as an
infringer.103
Rescuecom did not define the scope and contours of Google’s potential direct
liability based on keyword ads. The above language suggests that Google could
face liability even if it was the advertiser itself that sowed confusion through a
misleading ad. The court, however, indicated that its primary concern was whether
Google itself was creating confusion by obfuscating the difference between
advertisements and search results:
[Confusion] is particularly [likely], Rescuecom alleges, when the advertiser’s link
appears in a horizontal band at the top of the list of search results in a manner which
makes it appear to be the most relevant search result and not an advertisement. What
Rescuecom alleges is that by the manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of
competing brands in response to a search for Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails
100. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). A third, earlier opinion, Playboy v. Netscape, dodged the
question of whether to apply direct or contributory infringement standards to a trademark holder’s
claims against a search engine based on the use of its mark in keyword-based advertisements. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
101. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 125–27.
102. Id. at 130–31.
103. Id. at 130.
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adequately to identify the sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant
search result), Google creates a likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks. If
the searcher sees a different brand name as the top entry in response to the search for
“Rescuecom,” the searcher is likely to believe mistakenly that the different name
which appears is affiliated with the brand name sought in the search and will not
suspect, because the fact is not adequately signaled by Google’s presentation, that this
is not the most relevant response to the search.104

I have elsewhere advocated a reading of Rescuecom that would limit Google’s
liability to confusion caused by its presentation of the search results page, rather
than the content of particular ads.105 Yet the opinion does not specifically limit
itself to that context. By allowing a claim against Google based on its “use” of
marks to sell advertisements, and by defining confusion by reference to the
consumer’s response to particular ads, the court leaves open the possibility of a
direct claim against Google for confusion caused by advertisers.106 Indeed, the
court appeared convinced that it needed direct infringement doctrine to address the
risk of inducement: “If we were to adopt Google’s and its amici’s argument, the
operators of search engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to
deceive and cause confusion.”107 Under Inwood, however, such use of trademarks
would easily satisfy the inducement standard, and therefore direct infringement is
unnecessary.108
If Rescuecom is limited to its facts—the allegations that Google confused
consumers through placement of ads and search results—then it represents an
aberrational but probably harmless use of the doctrine of direct infringement. If,
however, future courts interpret Rescuecom to allow direct infringement claims
against intermediaries based on confusion sowed by their users, then this new form
of direct infringement would conflict directly with the non-interference rule. It is
beyond question by now that trademark-focused keyword advertising has many
lawful applications—for example, to call attention to competing products,
complementary products, used products, criticisms or third-party reviews. By
finding an intermediary liable for particular confusing ads, without prior notice, the
law would inevitably burden such legitimate speech.
Given this risk and the inconsistency of such a reading with Tiffany (also a
Second Circuit opinion), Rescuecom may well be limited to its facts. The Fourth
Circuit’s direct infringement analysis in Rosetta Stone, however, is harder to
cabin.109 In that case, the plaintiff charged Google with direct infringement based
on a 2009 policy change, in which Google decided to allow the use of trademarks
in the text of keyword-generated ads.110 The evidence suggested that, at the time of
104. Id. at 131.
105. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It,” supra note 30, at ¶ 20 (“Direct liability required
Google itself to engage in consumer manipulation.”).
106. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131–32.
107. Id. at 130.
108. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 852–54 (1982).
109. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
110. Id. at 151–52. From 2004 until 2009, Google allowed keyword-based advertising but
prohibited the unauthorized use of trademarks in ads themselves. Before 2004, Google’s policy
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the policy change, Google knew that confusion could result from the use of
trademarks in ads.111 In fact, a number of counterfeiters had misused the policy to
advertise counterfeit Rosetta Stone software.112 Yet undoubtedly, the policy
change also enabled perfectly lawful and informative ads, such as advertisements
for used versions of the expensive software.113 Google’s new policy, in other
words, was not in itself illegal or confusing; like other “mixed-use” acts and
products, it created a risk that third parties might misuse it in infringing ways.
Because of the mixed-use nature of Google’s service and its secondary role in
enabling infringement, the principles of secondary liability have obvious salience.
The non-interference principle has special relevance, given the public’s interest in
access to trademarks for informational and other uses. Yet the Fourth Circuit
ignored those principles and undertook a bizarre, truncated analysis of the
“likelihood of confusion” factors used in analyzing direct infringement claims.114
Most of these factors, of course, made no sense in a suit against a search engine.
Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone mark, the court found, was largely nominative,
meaning that factors such as the strength of the mark and similarity between the
marks were “clearly of limited value.”115 Moreover, because Google did not itself
offer products or services under the mark, several additional factors, including
similarity in products or services, quality of products and similarities in sales
channels and advertising, were also irrelevant.116
After finding almost all of the likelihood of confusion factors inapt, the court
was left with only three plausible candidates: intent, actual confusion and
consumer sophistication.117 The court’s analysis of these factors suggests that
direct infringement could turn into an exercise in bare fact finder discretion, which
could jeopardize or undo the calibration achieved in the contributory infringement
context. On intent, the court concluded that a reasonable fact finder could find that
Google “intended to cause confusion in that it acted with the knowledge that
confusion was very likely to result from its use of the marks.”118 This is like saying
that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Sony had intended to cause
copyright infringement because it knew that some home tapers would use its
machine to infringe. Google’s policy change did not create confusion; it enabled
“precluded both the use of trademarks in the text of an advertisement and the use of trademarks as
keywords upon the request of the trademark holder.” Id.
111. See id. at 156.
112. Id. at 152.
113. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128–29 (1947) (allowing use of
original manufacturer’s trademarks in connection with the sale of used or reconditioned goods).
Google’s policy specifically allowed the use of trademarks in the text of ads in four contexts: “(1) the
sponsor is a reseller of a genuine trademarked product; (2) the sponsor makes or sells component parts
for a trademarked product; (3) the sponsor offers compatible parts or goods for use with the trademarked
product or (4) the sponsor provides information about or reviews a trademarked product.” Rosetta
Stone, 676 F.3d at 151–52. All of these, of course, constitute lawful uses of third-party marks.
114. Id. at 154–56.
115. Id. at 154.
116. Id. at 155.
117. Id. at 153–56.
118. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
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others (including sellers of counterfeit Rosetta Stone products) to do so. The fact
that Google knew that some of its advertisers would abuse its advertising policies
does not mean that it intended them to do so, any more than the defendants in
Tiffany and Sony intended to cause infringement. Google’s knowledge went to risk
of confusion, not certainty; both Sony and Inwood proscribe liability under those
circumstances.119 The court’s analysis of intent flatly violated the non-interference
principle.
The court’s conflation of Google’s and its advertisers’ acts in its actual
confusion analysis is equally problematic. In considering whether consumers were
actually confused, the court did not look at Google’s ad policy across the board to
determine whether trademarks in ad text consistently caused confusion. Instead,
the court looked only at counterfeit ads, and thus attributed to Google the confusion
created by counterfeit sellers, who were acting in violation of Google’s ad
policy.120 Again, Google’s ad policy may well have created a risk that this
wrongdoing would occur, but it was the ads—not the policy—that led to deception
of consumers. Like the auction site in Tiffany v. eBay and the VCR in Sony, the
policy enabled both legitimate and illegitimate uses and therefore did not alone
cause the “actual confusion” related to the counterfeit ads.
I do not mean to suggest that Google should be immune from liability for
confusion caused by advertisements for counterfeit products. If Google knows of a
particular advertisement that is hawking counterfeit goods, it has an obligation to
disable access to that ad. More generally, Google has a responsibility to keep its
eyes open to evidence of actual counterfeit advertisements and sales. Yet these
obligations go to its responsibility to help police another party’s wrongdoing; they
have nothing to do with whether Google committed a wrongdoing itself by
allowing advertisers to use trademarks in the text of ads. Its policy has important
informational value to consumers, because it enables them to find used,
reconditioned and compatible products. By holding that a jury could find that
Google had intentionally created confusion through its policy, the court conflated
questions of risk and wrongdoing, and violated the core principles of secondary
liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the interests at stake in intermediary liability cases, courts must take care
to preserve the careful balance between non-interference, culpability and
reasonableness. As the Supreme Court has made clear, special rules apply to
parties who do not themselves violate intellectual property rights, but who facilitate
others’ infringement. In evaluating their liability, courts must take care not to

119. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439–42 (1984); Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
120. The evidence of actual confusion consisted of: (1) consumer testimony; (2) an expert report;
(3) Google documents and (4) testimony suggesting that Google’s own employees could not tell the
difference between ads for genuine and for counterfeit Rosetta Stone products. See Rosetta Stone Ltd.,
676 F.3d at 156–59.
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interfere with legitimate commerce, including legal and information-disseminating
uses of protected trademarks.
If, as seems likely, direct infringement claims against intermediaries are here to
stay, courts must take care to distinguish between behavior that is harmful in itself,
and behavior that increases the risk of wrongdoing by others. If, as in Rosetta
Stone, a policy change by an intermediary increases the risk of infringement but
also creates possibilities for non-infringing use, it must be evaluated under
standards of contributory infringement and principles of secondary liability. Direct
infringement claims should be reserved for behavior that on its own creates the
harm that the law seeks to avoid. While a narrow reading of Rescuecom is
consistent with that treatment, Rosetta Stone is not. Courts should restore the law
of intermediary liability to a system of principled standards, rather than leaving
boundless discretion to fact finders.

